Reducing Tobacco Use and Access Through Strengthened Minimum Price Laws by McLaughlin, Ian et al.
GOVERNMENT, LAW, AND PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE
Maximizing the Effectiveness of Public
Health Strategies
Reducing Tobacco Use and Access Through Strengthened
Minimum Price Laws
Ian McLaughlin, JD, Anne Pearson, JD, Elisa Laird-Metke, JD, and Kurt Ribisl, PhD
Higher prices reduce con-
sumption and initiation of to-
bacco products. A minimum
price law that establishesahigh
statutory minimum price and
prohibits the industry’s dis-
counting tactics for tobacco
products is a promising pricing
strategy as an alternative to
excise tax increases.
Although some states have
adopted minimum price laws
on the basis of statutorily de-
fined price “markups” over the
invoice price, existing state laws
have been largely ineffective at
increasing the retail price.
We analyzed 3 new varia-
tions of minimum price laws
that hold great potential for
raising tobacco prices and re-
ducing consumption: (1) a flat
rateminimumprice law similar
to a recent enactment in New
York City, (2) an enhanced
markup law, and (3) a law that
incorporates both elements.




480 000 people die from
tobacco-related disease in the
United States, making tobacco-
related disease the leading cause
of preventable death in the na-
tion.1 In response, state and local
governments have employed
a wide variety of policy and pro-
grammatic strategies to reduce the
burden of tobacco-related disease
and death.
Extensive research has shown
that when tobacco prices increase,
fewer people begin using tobacco,
more people quit, and continuing
users reduce their consumption.1--4
This is especially true for youths
and other price-sensitive popula-
tions.5--8 The tobacco industry has
understood the relationship be-
tween tobacco prices and con-
sumption for many years5 and has
devised numerous strategies to
manipulate tobacco prices.5,9 In
2011, cigarette manufacturers spent
$7 billion dollars—83.6% of total
promotional expenditures—on pro-
grams designed to lower the real
cost of cigarettes to consumers.10
Tobacco companies also spent
more than $168 million—37.4% of
total promotional spending—on
similar strategies to reduce the price
of smokeless tobacco.11
We reviewed 3 existing strate-
gies that are currently used to reg-
ulate the prices of cigarettes and
tobacco products. We have de-
scribed the advantages and limita-
tions of those strategies and models
for 3 novel minimum price laws
that could more effectively increase
price, thereby having a greater im-




Three primary policy strategies
that are intended to directly regu-
late the price of cigarettes have been
employed in the United States: ex-
cise taxes, markup-style minimum
price laws, and laws prohibiting
specific price discounting tactics.
Although these strategies can, and
should, be used in conjunction with
each other, to date they have rarely
been used as part of a coordinated
pricing strategy.
Excise Taxes
Tobacco taxes are the most
common approach that govern-
ments use to increase revenue and
raise tobacco prices and have been
called the single most effective
tobacco control intervention.12 In
addition to increasing price, excise
taxes generate significant govern-
ment revenue that can be partially
or entirely earmarked for tobacco
use prevention and cessation pro-
grams, research, or treatment.
Although every state has im-
posed a cigarette excise tax at
some level, increasing taxes
further is not politically feasible in
many jurisdictions because of
a lack of political will among legis-
lators or a lack of popular support,
sometimes coupled with superma-
jority voting requirements for tax
measures and gubernatorial veto
power. Moreover, local excise taxes
were imposed in only 7 states in
2011, largely owing to state pre-
emption of local taxes.13
Furthermore, increasing an ex-
cise tax without an accompanying
restriction on price discounting
does not preclude the tobacco
industry from employing addi-
tional price reduction programs
to blunt the effect for price-
sensitive consumers, thereby
undermining its public health im-
pact.7 For example, after the
2009 federal excise tax increase
of $1.01 per pack, Phillip Morris
stated its intention to offset the
tax increase with coupons and
discounts for smokers who were
registered with Marlboro.14
In short, although excise taxes
remain a critical tobacco control
strategy, political barriers often
prevent tax increases, and the
tobacco industry has found ways
to dilute the effectiveness of tax
increases as a public health inter-
vention by stepping up retail price
discounting.
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Minimum Price Laws
Before 2013, 24 states and the
District of Columbia had enacted
legislation requiring cigarettes to
be sold at higher than a statutory
minimum price.15 These state-level
cigarette minimum price laws
generally have been modeled
after each other and therefore
have many common characteris-
tics. Most notably they are all
“markup”-style laws requiring
a minimum percentage markup at
both the distributor and retailer
levels, starting with the invoice
price as a baseline (i.e., the retail
price must be a specified percent-
age higher than the wholesale
price, and the wholesale price
must be a specified percentage
higher than the invoice cost to the
distributor). These laws were
mostly enacted decades ago to help
small retailers by preventing unfair
business practices suchas loss leader
sales—selling cigarettes at a loss to
lure customers and recouping lost
profits through the sale of other
products that the customer is likely
to buy once inside the store.15
An analysis of scanner data (re-
tail purchase information gathered
electronically at the point of sale)
has shown that retail cigarette pri-
ces are not higher in states with
minimum price laws, in part be-
cause existing laws merely prohibit
the sale of tobacco below cost or
require only a very small percent-
age markup.16 In addition, existing
state minimum price laws include
significant loopholes that under-
mine their effectiveness, such as
allowing coupons and other dis-
counts to reduce the sale price
below the statutory minimum.
In November 2013, the New
York City Council adopted a
minimum price ordinance (referred
to as the Sensible Tobacco En-
forcement ordinance) as a public
health measure that addresses
many of the loopholes that have
been identified in state minimum
price laws.17 The New York City
ordinance establishes a single “flat
rate” minimum price for cigarettes
and little cigars and prohibits cer-
tain price discounting tactics. The
ordinance may be implemented
any time after June 18, 2014,
after a federal district court judge
rejected constitutional challenges
the National Association of To-
bacco Outlets raised that were very
similar to those it argued unsuc-
cessfully against in the Providence,
Rhode Island, ordinance prohibiting
industry price reduction practices
(discussed next).18 Although it will not
yield evaluation data for some time,
the ordinance contains many of the
provisions that should be included
in a strong minimum price law.
Prohibitions on Industry Price
Reduction Practices
A third type of pricing strategy
that is currently employed in a
limited number of jurisdictions
prohibits specific price discounting
schemes, such as the redemption
of coupons or multipack offers.
These types of laws have gener-
ated interest in recent years but
have been adopted in only 2
jurisdictions thus far, Providence,
Rhode Island, and New York City,
and are therefore relatively un-
tested. Moreover, they require
careful crafting to avoid unin-
tended loopholes. For example,
because the tobacco industry em-
ploys a broad array of tactics to
lower retail prices (and continually
devises new tactics), it is difficult to
craft a policy that addresses every
foreseeable category and permu-
tation of industry price discounting
tactics. Therefore, to remain
effective this type of policy must
be revised periodically as new
industry strategies emerge.
Moreover, the tobacco industry
and retailers will continue to claim
that some industry price reduction
practices are constitutionally or
statutorily protected because they
constitute “promotion” or “com-
mercial expression.” These legal
issues have begun to play out in
courts of law but likely will not be
resolved for many years.
Nonetheless, there remains
great interest in laws directly pro-
hibiting the retail price manipula-
tion tactics of the tobacco industry.
In January 2012, the City of
Providence, Rhode Island, adopted
a tobacco pricing ordinance that
prohibits tobacco retailers in the
city from redeeming coupons,
selling multipack tobacco prod-
ucts, and offering certain pricing
discounts for tobacco products.19
New York City’s Sensible Tobacco
Enforcement legislation contains
similar provisions.17
The National Association of To-
bacco Outlets led a coalition that
sued the City of Providence, chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the
ordinance on preemption and First
Amendment grounds.20 In Septem-
ber 2013, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s
ruling that the law does not violate
the First Amendment, finding that
the limitations relate to sales prac-
tices and not to protected commer-
cial speech.21 That same conclusion
supported the court’s finding that
the law is not preempted by the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (FCLAA), which
preempts state or local regulations
limiting the advertising or promo-
tion of cigarettes.21
This favorable ruling on the
Providence ordinance could lead to
more laws prohibiting retail price
manipulation tactics. Although
these types of laws may never be
sufficiently comprehensive to ad-
dress all retail price discounting
tactics, they can be an effective
complement to both excise taxes





minimum price laws were enacted
to protect economic competition,
a strongly crafted law that estab-
lishes high minimum prices and
eliminates loopholes can be adop-
ted as a public health measure
designed to increase prices and
reduce consumption of tobacco
products. This purpose is signifi-
cant legally, but it is also significant
for building popular and political
support. The health risks of to-
bacco use are overwhelming and
well documented; those risks can
be used to persuade policymakers
and the public about the need for
this type of intervention.
There are 3 alternative ap-
proaches to a stronger minimum
price law: a flat rate law, an im-
proved markup law, and a hybrid
law that incorporates elements of
both. Although a state or munici-
pality can adopt each of these ap-
proaches, most local governments
(except for those in the largest cities
and counties) probably lack the
personnel and infrastructure
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necessary to effectively implement
a minimum price law.
Flat Rate Minimum Price Law
A flat rate minimum price law
simply establishes an explicit
baseline statutory minimum price
below which tobacco products
may not be sold (e.g., $8.00 per
package of cigarettes) and requires
the minimum price to be adjusted
annually on the basis of inflation.
Rather than affecting the price of
all cigarettes (or tobacco products),
products that are usually priced
above the statutory minimum
would be unaffected, whereas all
products that are typically priced
below the minimum price must be
removed from the market if the
price is not increased.
Although this approach is un-
tested, New York City’s Sensible
Tobacco Enforcement legislation
(signed into law in November
2013) establishes a flat rate min-
imum price of $10.50 for a pack-
age of cigarettes and an equiva-
lent floor for little cigars.17 This
law, which also prohibits many
specific price discounting tactics,
is the first in the United States to





price laws have not been effec-
tive at increasing the overall
price of cigarettes because of the
industry discounting strategies
and other loopholes that bring
prices below the statutory mini-
mums. A stronger markup law
would require retail percentage
markups that are higher than
those that currently exist and
eliminate loopholes that allow
sales below the statutory mini-
mum price.
Nonetheless, enforcement chal-
lenges will persist for a policy that
establishes a separate minimum
price for all brands of cigarettes on
the basis of the invoice price the
tobacco industry sets. For effective
enforcement, both retailers and
government officials will need to
monitor minimum prices for all
brands sold in the state to ensure
compliance and will also need to
ensure that invoice costs and
markups are accurately calculated.
Although this will require diligent
enforcement, it can work effec-
tively with a coordinated effort
among the government agencies
involved in enforcing tax laws and
other laws requiring inspections in
the retail environment.
Hybrid Minimum Price Law
A third option is a combination
of the 2 approaches—to establish
a flat rate minimum price and
require a substantial percentage
markup for all products above the
flat rate minimum.
This approach is the most
comprehensive; it increases the
price of higher tier brands and
eliminates deeply discounted
brands that sell below the statu-




Although the 3 approaches
have commonalities, significant
TABLE 1—Characteristics and Market Effects of Proposed Model Minimum Price Laws
Type of Minimum Price Law Description Characteristics and Potential Effect on Market
1. Flat rate minimum price Sets a specific floor price below which no tobacco product
may be sold
Would create a baseline minimum price, simplifying implementation
and enforcement.
Tobacco companies could continue to set their own retail prices as long
as they are above the amount established by law. “High end” tobacco
products would be unaffected by law.
Requires automatic inflationary adjustments in the law or updates at
regular intervals to keep pace with inflation.
2. Markup minimum price Requires high minimum percentage markup at the retail level from an
identified baseline price (e.g., list price or wholesale price)
Would not require adjustments for inflation.
Would create a distinct minimum price for each of the hundreds of
brands of tobacco products on the market, and the minimum prices
would change over time, complicating compliance and enforcement.
Tobacco companies may be able to manipulate the base cost identified
in the law to lower the minimum retail price.
3. Hybrid flat rate or markup law Requires high minimum percentage markup at the retail level and sets
a specific price floor below which no tobacco product may be sold
Would create both a baseline minimum price and a product-specific
minimum price for each of the hundreds of brands of tobacco
products above the baseline floor price.
As with the flat rate price alone, this approach requires inflationary
adjustments.
Tobacco companies still may be able to manipulate the base cost on
which the markup is based to lower minimum price.
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Each of the 3 approaches can
be used to establish a minimum
price for both cigarettes and non-
cigarette tobacco products. As
cigarette use among youths signif-
icantly declined between 2003
and 2011, the prevalence rate for
other tobacco products such as
cigars, hookahs, dissolvable to-
bacco, and electronic cigarettes
have increased among youths.22
Therefore, a pricing strategy that
increases the prices of these prod-
ucts is critical to address youths’
use and initiation.
Calculating the appropriate
minimum price for other tobacco
products, however, will be chal-
lenging because of the variation in
the number and type of different
noncigarette tobacco products, in-
cluding smokeless tobacco and
electronic smoking devices. Com-
bining a minimum price law with
a minimum package size require-
ment (such as the 20-per-pack
minimum for cigarettes) could
help create uniformity for nonci-
garette tobacco products. In addi-
tion, state laws that tax other
tobacco products at a rate de-
signed to be equivalent to ciga-
rettes can provide guidance for
calculating an equivalent mini-
mum price for some noncigarette
products; establishing minimum
prices for other products will likely
require input from state tax pro-
fessionals and public health econ-
omists.
Also, to determine whether
a strong minimum price law is an
effective tobacco control strategy,
it is critical to evaluate whether the
law actually results in higher to-
bacco prices and its effect on
consumption patterns and ulti-
mately smoking rates. Therefore,
a strong policy must incorporate
an evaluation component, regard-
less of which approach is used.
Different Effects of Flat Rate
and Markup Laws
Flat rate, markup, and hybrid
minimum price laws share the goal
of raising prices high enough to
reduce consumption, but the ap-
proaches differentially affect to-
bacco products at different price
points.
A flat rate law would bar the
sale of very cheap products that
historically are sold below the
minimum price (except perhaps
those that are normally priced
very close to the minimum price,
for which the price may be slightly
increased to comply with the law).
Higher end products, priced above
the floor price, would be unaf-
fected by the law. By contrast,
a markup law does not completely
eliminate any products. All brands
become more expensive by a cer-
tain percentage, but very cheap
products may still exist. A hybrid
approach combines the effects of
both a flat rate and a markup law.
All tobacco product prices would
increase, and very cheap products




No law is effective without an
effective implementation and en-
forcement plan. A flat rate law
resulting in a single minimum
price is much simpler for retailers
and enforcement officials than a
markup or a hybrid law, which
results in a different price for each
brand. But even a markup law
does not necessarily require cre-
ating entirely new enforcement
procedures; any minimum price
law could be incorporated with
other laws that are monitored in
the retail environment. For exam-
ple, every state enforces its to-
bacco tax laws, often through re-
tail inspections that could be
expanded to include price inspec-
tions as well. In addition, most
states and many local govern-
ments effectively use tobacco re-
tailer licensing to enforce not only
tax laws but also other laws in the
retail environment (such as youth
access laws).23 A minimum price
law could be incorporated into
a licensing system as a separate
condition of the license.
By leveraging existing enforce-
ment mechanisms, it is more likely
the law will be properly enforced.
Nonetheless, insufficient enforce-
ment has been one of the primary
reasons (along with industry dis-
counting and modest markup
percentages) that existing mini-
mum price laws have not resulted
in higher prices.16 To avoid the
same problem, a specific enforce-
ment plan must be developed
along with a minimum price pol-
icy, designating a primary enforc-
ing agency, mandating a minimum
number of compliance inspec-
tions, and instituting a system to
monitor enforcement efforts to
determine if changes are neces-
sary.
Eliminating Loopholes
Eliminating loopholes is also
necessary for a successful law. A
common loophole in most existing
minimum price laws is that they
do not prohibit coupons and other
discounts that drive the ultimate
sale price below the statutory
minimum.15
A strong policy must address
this loophole by prohibiting com-
mon discounting tactics the to-
bacco industry uses, such as cou-
pon and multipack offers. This
type of prohibition is not widely
employed but is an effective com-
plement to both excise taxes and
minimum price laws. An estimated
55.4% of adults who smoke use
some price minimizing strategy
and save an average of $1.27 per
pack.24 Failure to address cou-
pons, multipack offers, and other
common discounts would signifi-
cantly undermine the effective-
ness of any minimum price law.
In addition to the loophole
allowing coupons and other dis-
counts, many existing laws allow
a retailer to sell products below
the statutory minimum price to
match a competitor’s prices.25
This type of exception makes
sense for a law designed to pro-
mote economic competition but is
not appropriate in a law designed




A law establishing a high mini-
mum retail price for tobacco
products has potential unintended
consequences that should be
monitored and evaluated as the
law is implemented. When con-
templating potential unintended
consequences, it is important to
note that the goal of a strong
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minimum price law is to reduce
tobacco use and initiation and that
a pricing law should be imple-
mented as part of a comprehen-
sive tobacco control strategy that
includes both policy and pro-
grammatic interventions to change
social norms around tobacco use
and assist users to quit.
Foremost, because smoking
rates among low-income popula-
tions are higher than are those in
other income groups, a price in-
crease for cigarettes and other
tobacco products has the potential
to impose a disproportionate fi-
nancial burden on these individ-
uals, especially those who are
addicted.26 However, because
low-income tobacco users are also
particularly responsive to price
changes, a price increase should
lead to the largest declines in
smoking among this group,26---28
especially as part of an overall
strategy supplemented with cul-
turally appropriate interventions
designed to facilitate smoking ces-
sation in low-income communities
and communities of color and to
reduce the prevalence of tobacco
in these communities.29
Because the highest rates of
tobacco-related illness occur
within low-income communities,
the anticipated health benefits oc-
cur at a higher rate among disad-
vantaged individuals. However,
low-income tobacco users who
do not change their behavior by
quitting or cutting back will pay
disproportionately more for their
cigarettes when prices rise.
Higher tobacco prices may lead
price-sensitive smokers to respond
by purchasing cheaper cigarettes
from outside the state on the
contraband market.30 For a strong
minimum price law to effectively
reduce tobacco use, it is critical
that a state or local government
adopt and enforce equally strong
laws prohibiting sales of contra-
band tobacco products.
Even if cigarette users are not
driven to a contraband market,
they may experiment with other
tobacco products, as some degree
of tobacco product substitution
occurs when cigarette prices are
high relative to the price of
smokeless and other tobacco
products.31 For this reason, an
effective policy should also man-
date minimum prices for other
tobacco products, coupled with
cessation programs and policies to
limit the availability of all tobacco
products in low-income neighbor-
hoods, which have been hit the
hardest by the negative effects of
tobacco use.
LEGAL ISSUES
A law that mandates a specific
price structure for a heavily regu-
lated product like tobacco raises
several legal issues. The FCLAA
and the First Amendment to the
US Constitution are raised in
nearly every legal challenge
to a tobacco control interven-
tion and federal antitrust laws
are relevant to a pricing regula-
tion. The goal is to develop
price-related policies that avoid





The FCLAA states, “No re-
quirement or prohibition based
on smoking and health shall be
imposed under state law with re-
spect to the advertising or pro-
motion of any cigarettes.”32 In
2009, the federal Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act (Tobacco Control Act) added
language to FCLAA to allow state
or local governments to impose
“specific bans or restrictions on the
time, place, and manner, but not
content, of the advertising or pro-
motion of any cigarettes.”33 (Note
that FCLAA applies only to ciga-
rettes and not to other tobacco
products.)
Because a minimum cigarette
price policy is designed to protect
public health and is a law “based
on smoking and health,” FCLAA
would be a potential legal barrier
if (1) a court were to find that this
type of regulation, including the
prohibition on coupons or multi-
pack offers, constitutes a “require-
ment . . . with respect to . . . pro-
motion of any cigarettes”32 and
(2) none of the exceptions the
Tobacco Control Act inserts apply.
No court has analyzed a mini-
mum price law under FCLAA,
which has most often been ana-
lyzed in the context of distribution
of free samples of cigarettes. In
those cases, the courts have inter-
preted “promotion” quite broadly
and often turned to the word’s
dictionary definition.34 Indeed, 4
of the 5 courts that have taken up
the issue have determined that
distribution of free cigarette sam-
ples constitutes promotion.35 By
contrast, the California Supreme
Court found exactly the opposite—
that distribution of free cigarette
samples is not promotion—and
strongly suggested that a mini-
mum price law would also not
regulate promotion.36 In light of
this judicial conflict, the industry
will argue that minimum price
legislation that prohibits specific
discounting tactics also constitutes
a regulation of promotion under
the FCLAA.
However, it is important to note
that the sampling cases were all
decided before FCLAA was
amended by the Tobacco Control
Act. Even if a minimum price law
or prohibitions against price dis-
counting tactics were found to fall
within the scope of FCLAA (which
is uncertain and likely depends
on the court), if challenged, both
stand a good chance of being upheld
under the exceptions the Tobacco
Control Act added for regulations
affecting the “manner, but not the
content” of promotion.33
The trial and appellate courts
that decided the case upholding
the Providence, Rhode Island, or-
dinance banning coupon redemp-
tion (but not distribution) and
multipack sales are the only courts
to discuss the “manner” exception
at length as of the time of drafting
of this article. Both courts con-
cluded that the Providence ordi-
nance does not regulate the content
of the promotional materials but
merely how cigarettes can be sold
and purchased and therefore is
not preempted by FCLAA.21 If
other courts were to follow the
lead of the First Circuit Court
of Appeals (which reviewed the
Providence case), FCLAA would
similarly pose no barrier to a
strong minimum price policy.
First Amendment
The First Amendment to the US
Constitution forbids the govern-
ment from making any law
“abridging the freedom of speech.”
1848 | Government, Law, and Public Health Practice | Peer Reviewed | McLaughlin et al. American Journal of Public Health | October 2014, Vol 104, No. 10
GOVERNMENT, LAW, AND PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE
In addition to protecting the ex-
pression of private individuals,
in the past 40 years the First
Amendment has also been inter-
preted to protect corporate ad-
vertising and promotion—in legal
terms, “commercial speech.”37
Under Supreme Court case law,
this has come to mean that the
right of corporations to advertise
and promote their products and
services can outweigh the govern-
ment’s right to regulate commer-
cial speech to safeguard public
health, safety, and welfare.38
However, the First Amendment
poses no barrier to a policy that
focuses solely on prices and sales
practices and does not regulate
advertising and promotion.39 For
that reason, a strong minimum
price law that prohibits specific
discounting practices should be
framed as an intervention that
solely addresses pricing practices
with the goal of reducing con-
sumption of tobacco products.
Even so, the tobacco industry
would likely argue that the First
Amendment is implicated by
a minimum price policy that also
prohibits discounting practices such
as coupons and multipack offers,
characterizing these discounts as
protected commercial speech.
In September 2013, the First
Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed
just such a First Amendment
challenge, again involving the
Providence pricing ordinance that
prohibits the redemption (but
not distribution) of coupons and
sales of tobacco multipacks.21
The appellate court found no
First Amendment violation, be-
cause the restrictions were merely
a means to control the price of
tobacco products and did not
implicate commercial speech at
all—the law did not restrict the
tobacco companies’ ability to dis-
tribute coupons and advertise and
promote their products.20
In light of this decision, a strong
minimum price policy can estab-
lish a statutory price for sales of
cigarettes and tobacco products
and prohibit price reductions
through coupons or multipack
offers. To be effective, the law
should not prohibit advertising or
promotion, which could trigger
First Amendment protections.
Rather, the policy should focus
narrowly on restricting certain
sales practices to avoid First
Amendment concerns.
Antitrust Laws
Antitrust laws are a low hurdle
to a pricing law but bear men-
tioning because of the close re-
lationship between price and anti-
trust historically. Federal and state
antitrust laws generally prohibit
private conduct that interferes
with free and open competition.40
In other words, they forbid busi-
nesses from engaging in anticom-
petitive collusion or attempts to
monopolize, and they prohibit
laws that foster or require such
private collusion.
Existing minimum price laws
for cigarettes are themselves anti-
trust laws, because they are
intended to prohibit large retailers
from using cigarettes as a loss
leader to drive out competition in
the marketplace. The minimum
price laws should not violate anti-
trust laws as long as they are
unilaterally imposed by the
government—without allowing
involvement of tobacco manufac-
turers, wholesalers, and retailers in
creating pricing restrictions and
setting the minimum price.41
CONCLUSIONS
There are several policy ap-
proaches to directly regulate the
retail price of tobacco products,
including excise taxes, antiprice
discounting laws, and existing
minimum price laws. Although
each of these policies can be ef-
fective at reducing consumption of
and access to tobacco products,
a tightly drafted and comprehen-
sive minimum price law that
causes a substantial increase in the
price of tobacco while banning
price discount tactics could ad-
dress some of the political and
practical challenges that have
been identified with existing
price-related policies.
Although there are different
approaches to establish a strong
minimum price, a flat rate law has
several advantages for implemen-
tation and enforcement and elim-
inates very cheap products. For
states with the appropriate en-
forcement infrastructure, a hybrid
approach could be even stronger
and would create a major deter-
rent for youths experimenting
with tobacco and a strong incen-
tive for current smokers to quit. j
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